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Does Wine Have a Place in Kant’s Theory of Taste?1 
Rachel Cristy, Princeton University 
 
Abstract: Kant claims in the third Critique that one can make about wine the merely subjective 
judgment that it is agreeable but never the universally valid judgment that it is beautiful. This follows 
from his views that judgments of beauty can be made only about the formal (spatiotemporal) features 
of a representation and that aromas and flavors consist of formless sensory matter. However, I argue 
that Kant’s theory permits judgments of beauty about wine because the experience displays a 
temporal structure: the aromas and flavors evolve over the course of a tasting from the bouquet 
through the palate to the finish. An analogy with music, which Kant describes as “a play of sensations 
in time,” illuminates how wine qualifies as an object of pure judgments of taste: the “structure” of a 
wine can be compared to harmonic structure, and its development throughout the taste can be 
compared to the unfolding of melody and harmonic progression. 
 
 
 Kant’s own answer to my title question is “no.” One can make of a wine the merely 
subjective judgment that it is agreeable, never the universally valid judgment that it is beautiful. 
Here is Kant’s only remark on wine in the Critique of the Power of Judgment: 
With regard to the agreeable, everyone is content that his judgment, which he grounds on a private 
feeling, and in which he says of an object that it pleases him, be restricted merely to his own person. 
Hence he is perfectly happy if, when he says that sparkling wine from the Canaries is agreeable, 
someone else should improve his expression and remind him that he should say “It is agreeable to 
me”; and this is so not only in the case of the taste of the tongue, palate, and throat, but also in the 
case of that which may be agreeable to someone’s eyes and ears. (KU §7, 5: 212) 
 
Here is Kant’s explanation for why wine can’t be judged beautiful: “Aesthetic judgments can be 
divided into empirical and pure. The first are those which assert agreeableness or 
disagreeableness, the second those which assert beauty of an object […] the former are 
judgments of sense (material aesthetic judgments), the latter (as formal) are alone proper 
judgments of taste” (§14, 5: 223). Not only flavors and aromas, but also “mere color, e.g., the 
green of a lawn” and “mere tone […] say that of a violin” are relegated to judgments of 
 
1 This is the version of the paper that was accepted for publication by the Journal of the American Philosophical 
Association in 2015. 
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agreeableness, because they “have as their ground merely the matter of the representations, 
namely mere sensation” (§14, 5: 224). 
 Kant anticipates objections to his disqualification of color and “tone” (which he uses 
variously to mean timbre or pitch) as candidates for beauty. He acknowledges that “most people” 
would call a color or tone beautiful, and insists that such judgments are responding to the formal 
aspects of the representation (§14, 5: 224). But he does not expect similar objections on behalf of 
flavors or smells, the objects of the “lower” senses. Recently, however, objections have arisen, in 
both professional philosophy and popular opinion. Tim Crane (2007) regards wines as “aesthetic 
objects,” bearing aesthetic value that gives us reasons to experience them (144). Steve Charters 
and Simone Pettigrew (2005) found, in focus groups of wine consumers and industry 
professionals, that “by a ratio of about three to one, informants considered that the consumption 
of wine shows some similarities to the appreciation of ‘pure’ art forms—especially music” (126). 
Charles Senn Taylor (1988) even argued that wine tasting is an aesthetic experience by matching 
up aspects of the process with Kant’s four moments of the judgment of beauty. 
 In this paper, I take it as given that Kant was wrong to dismiss wine as a possible object 
of judgments of beauty. I am also largely setting aside the question of whether Kant’s theory of 
taste is correct. My question is whether Kant’s theory can account for the status of wine as an 
object of distinctively aesthetic attention, and I am concerned with its truth only insofar as failure 
to incorporate wine constitutes an argument against it. I determine that Kant’s theory is capable 
of accounting for the aesthetic status of wine, though he himself did not recognize it. 
In answering my question, I focus on Kant’s infamous “formalism”2: his insistence that 
judgments of beauty must be based on the form that human cognition contributes to the 
 
2 I do not use the term as it is often used in aesthetics, to refer to the view that only immediately perceptible aspects 
of an object, not its mimetic or conceptual content or cultural context, contribute to its aesthetic value. As Zangwill 
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representation of an object, not on the components of the representation that come directly from 
sensation, which constitute the matter of experience. I consider whether the features that give 
wine its aesthetic value are formal in Kant’s sense: basically, spatiotemporal and therefore suited 
to mathematical description. I rather doubt that judgments about specific flavors and aromas are 
grounded in their spatial, mathematizable basis: the geometric structure of volatile molecules. 
But the feature I find most important in distinguishing aesthetically interesting from 
uninteresting wines clearly is formal: the temporal structure of the tasting experience. 
 
1. Wine and Kant’s Analytic of the Beautiful 
 Here I will describe how some judgments about wine meet Kant’s criteria for judgments 
of beauty laid out in the Analytic of the Beautiful.3 I leave aside for now the third moment of the 
judgment of taste, where Kant’s problematic formalism comes in. 
1.1 The First Moment: disinterested satisfaction 
 Judgments about wine can involve the satisfaction without interest that Kant names as the 
characteristic quality of judgments of beauty. He defines interest as “the satisfaction that we 
combine with the representation of the existence of an object” (KU §2, 5: 204). I have an interest 
in an object if I could use it to fulfill some goal or desire; my satisfaction in an object is 
disinterested if the pleasure comes from attending merely to its perceptible features. 
 To show that the satisfaction in an object is disinterested, one must show that it is not one 
of the kinds of satisfaction that essentially involve interest: satisfaction in the agreeable and in 
the good. Kant defines the agreeable as “that which pleases the senses in sensation” (§3, 5: 205). 
 
(1999) points out, Kant was not an “extreme formalist” in this sense, because his notion of adherent beauty allows 
him to account for the way an object’s function or representational content constrains assessment of its form. 
3 I take some cues from Taylor (1988), but the analysis is largely my own. 
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To say an object is agreeable is to say that “through sensation it excites a desire for objects of the 
same sort”; “It is not mere approval that I give it, rather inclination is thereby aroused” (§3, 5: 
207). The good involves interest, because calling something good “always involve[s] the concept 
of an end, hence the relation of reason to (at least possible) willing” (§4, 5: 207). Something is 
called good only in relation to an end it promotes, whether an end that reason imposes on all 
rational beings (fulfillment of the moral law), or some contingently held individual end. 
 Pleasure taken in wine need not be interested in either of these ways. Finding a wine 
agreeable is neither necessary nor sufficient for judging it aesthetically excellent. I can appreciate 
the elegance and complexity of a Cabernet Sauvignon even if I would not typically order it at a 
bar (because tannins dry out my mouth). Conversely, I can enjoy a refreshing but one-note Pinot 
grigio on a hot day without claiming it’s a great wine. Another interest one might have in wine is 
a desire for the agreeable sensation of intoxication. Wine appreciators, however, wish to avoid 
intoxication, which dulls the senses; expert evaluators spit out the wine after swishing it around 
their mouth thoroughly enough to experience all its flavors. 
 Preoccupation with notions of what is good for some end can also be an obstacle to the 
appreciation of beauty. This happens, for example, when consumers assume that wine quality 
increases consistently with price. People even report enjoying the same wine more when they 
believe it to be more expensive (Goldstein et al. 2008: 2)—perhaps because preconceptions 
about objective quality interfere with their experience, or because they wish to be seen as having 
sophisticated tastes. But data from thousands of blind tastings show no significant correlation 
between price and quality rating among wine experts, and show a negative correlation among 
non-experts (ibid., 4–5). In short, tasting wine with an eye to what is good, with respect to the 
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goal of social prestige, distracts from the sensory qualities of the wine and impedes aesthetic 
appreciation. 
1.2 The Second Moment: universal validity without a concept 
 When a person calls something beautiful, according to Kant, he “does not count on the 
agreement of others […], but rather demands it from them. He rebukes them if they judge 
otherwise, and denies that they have taste” (KU §7, 5: 212–3). This is often my approach to 
judging wine: when I call a wine “good” or even “beautiful,” I don’t just mean that I find it 
pleasant; I think others should share my judgment, and take them to be faulty judges if they 
don’t. 
 But although people “speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a property of the object and 
the judgment logical” (§6, 5: 211), a pure judgment of taste is not conceptual. It has subjective, 
not objective, universality: the claim is that everyone should feel a disinterested pleasure upon 
experiencing the object, not that it has a specifiable feature that makes it beautiful. “[T]here can 
[…] be no rule in accordance with which someone could be compelled to acknowledge 
something as beautiful” (§8, 5: 215). Rather, the state of mind involved in experiencing a 
beautiful object is felt to be “universally communicable” (§9, 5: 217). Pure judgments of taste 
are like cognitive judgments in their universal communicability and import, but unlike them in 
that they involve no concept or rule according to which one can classify objects as beautiful. 
Kant concludes from this paradoxical combination that the experience of beauty consists in a 
harmonious “free play” between the faculties involved in cognition, the imagination and the 
understanding, in which “no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition” 
(§9, 5: 217). 
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 Is this what happens in judging a wine? You could not convince me that a wine is 
beautiful simply by describing it; I must, as Kant says, “immediately hold the object up to my 
feeling of pleasure and displeasure” (§8, 5: 215). No combination of concepts is completely 
adequate to the experience; saying that a wine smells like jasmine, tastes like green apples, and 
feels crisp in the mouth hardly exhausts it. What’s more, these descriptions do not make it 
obvious whether, or why, a wine is good. My tasting notes on a Zinfandel I liked say that it 
tasted like marionberry at first and coffee on the finish, which in the abstract sounds like a 
bizarre combination. Some Rieslings are described approvingly as smelling of petrol. But such 
comparisons are imprecise approximations; a wine’s aromas and flavors combine in ways that 
cannot be reproduced by smelling or eating the substances they resemble. 
 My own experience of tasting an interesting wine and reaching for descriptors does feel 
like Kant’s “free play” of the imagination and understanding: my senses offer data to my 
intellect, which throws out concepts that might fit, rejecting some in favor of others (e.g., 
deciding marionberry is closer than blackberry), never satisfied that any of them fully captures 
the experience. I do not expect that everyone will like this wine because it tastes like 
marionberry and then coffee, or that every wine exhibiting those flavors will be beautiful. 
Nonetheless, I do expect that others who taste this wine will experience a similar pleasure, which 
is not purely sensory, but also engages the intellect; in this way my state of mind is universally 
communicable. (In fact, the difficulty people have finding satisfactory descriptors for their 
experience of wine makes it a better target for Kantian non-conceptual universal judgments.) 
Conversely, I find a wine aesthetically disappointing if some description—for example, that a 
Chardonnay tastes exactly like buttered popcorn, or a Merlot like cherry jam—completely sums 
it up. 
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1.3 The Fourth Moment: subjective necessity 
 The Fourth Moment expands on the universal communicability and normative force of 
aesthetic judgments. “Of every representation,” Kant explains, “I can say that it is at least 
possible that it […] be combined with a pleasure. Of that which I call agreeable I say that it 
actually produces a pleasure in me. Of the beautiful, however, one thinks that it has a necessary 
relation to satisfaction” (KU §18, 5: 236). Yet it is not an objective necessity: a failure to feel 
satisfaction upon beholding a beautiful object would produce no internal contradiction, no 
violation of the conditions that make experience possible, and no breach of the moral law. The 
judgment is non-conceptual, so it cannot generate any contradiction, propositional or practical. 
“Rather,” Kant continues, “it can only be called exemplary, i.e., a necessity of the assent of all 
to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that one cannot produce” (§18, 5: 
237). 
 Since there is no “objective principle” which can prove that everyone will or is obligated 
to feel pleasure, aesthetic judgment must presuppose a “subjective principle” according to which 
everyone should ideally feel pleasure. That is, we must posit some perceptual mechanism which 
is necessarily the same in everyone, and will therefore, when operating properly, produce in 
everyone the same feeling in response to a beautiful object; Kant labels this mechanism a 
“common sense” (§20, 5: 237–8). The judging subject’s experience of pleasure is thus a fully 
representative example of how this mechanism will, ideally, receive the beautiful object in 
everyone. In fact, Kant says, such a mechanism exists; it consists of the cognitive faculties: 
imagination and understanding. We cannot suppose that everyone’s sensory organs will respond 
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to an object in the same way,4 but the possibility of objective knowledge presupposes that 
everyone’s cognitive faculties operate in the same manner. 
 Kant concludes that encountering a beautiful object produces a “disposition of the 
cognitive powers […] in which [their] inner relationship is optimal for the animation of both 
powers of the mind […]; and this disposition cannot be determined except through the feeling 
(not by concepts)” (§21, 5: 238–9). The pleasure we feel in response to beautiful objects is our 
vague awareness of this optimal animation. We think everyone should feel the same because the 
workings of everyone’s cognitive faculties are supposed to be the same, including which objects 
induce their optimal configuration. If someone does not feel the same pleasure, we assume that 
something in his experience is defective: either he is not properly attending to all of the object’s 
features, so his faculties are not disposed as they should be; or something is amiss with his 
faculties themselves or his attunement to their operation—that is, his organ of the “common 
sense,” his sense of taste. 
 Does this account of the necessity of aesthetic judgments also apply to the judging of 
wine? Insofar as I demand that everyone agree with my judgment that a wine is beautiful, I 
regard the representation as combined with pleasure necessarily, not contingently for this one 
taster on this one occasion. If I demand that others share my judgment, but not because they 
subsume the wine under a concept that applies to it objectively, it is because I think they should 
perceive it in the same way, with faculties that operate in the same way as mine. I do not require 
 
4 I don’t have in mind physical differences that result in different objective judgments—such as having fewer than 
three cones (colorblindness), or an extra one (tetrachromatism), which lead to unusual judgments about whether two 
things are the same color. I mean differences in sensation that show up, if at all, only in judgments of agreeableness. 
For example, people who love coconut and people who hate it can both reliably recognize the flavor and may agree 
about which flavors it is similar or dissimilar to. They judge differently only about whether it is pleasant or 
unpleasant. The cognitive apparatus is operating the same way in both subjects, but we cannot say whether the 
difference in preference arises from the way coconut interacts with the sensory apparatus or merely with, in Kant’s 
terms, the faculty of pleasure and displeasure: does coconut present a different quality to the two subjects, albeit in a 
way they cannot describe, or do they merely have different reactions to the very same quality? 
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that everyone apply the same concepts to the wine; but I do think it should induce in everyone 
the same part-sensory, part-intellectual pleasure. 
 
2. Form and matter 
2.1 The form of purposiveness 
 Now I turn to the Third Moment of judgments of taste, where Kant introduces his 
infamous formalism. First he claims that beautiful objects exhibit purposiveness without an end 
(§11, 5: 221)5: 
An object or a state of mind or even an action […] even if its possibility does not necessarily 
presuppose the representation of an end, is called purposive merely because its possibility can only be 
explained and conceived by us insofar as we assume as its ground a causality in accordance with 
ends, i.e., a will that has arranged it so in accordance with the representation of a certain rule. (§10, 5: 
220) 
 
It is possible that a beautiful object (a flower, painting, or poem) arose through a causal process 
that did not involve a preexisting concept in the mind of an intelligent maker; but human beings 
can only comprehend such things by viewing them as products of this kind. Yet this is 
purposiveness without an end because the intellect can find no concept adequate to the 
experience of a beautiful object. If we judged the object to be an excellent realization of some 
concept, it would be a judgment of the good, not of beauty. Rather, the object seems like a 
skillful execution of some design we cannot reconstruct. “Thus we can at least observe a 
purposiveness concerning form” (§10, 5: 220)—or as Kant phrases it later, “the mere form of 
purposiveness” (§11, 5: 221)—“even without basing it in an end (as the matter of the nexus 
finalis)” (§10, 5: 220). 
 
5 Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck. Although this is often translated as “finality without an end” or “purposiveness 
without a purpose” to preserve the symmetry of the German, Guyer and Matthews (2000) translate it as 
“purposiveness without an end,” sacrificing symmetry for clarity of meaning and consistency of translation across 
Kant’s oeuvre (2000: xlviii). 
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 This merely formal purposiveness is mirrored in the play of the cognitive faculties. They 
interact as if to the end of producing a determinate cognition, but “without being restricted to a 
particular cognition” (§12, 5: 222)—because they cannot determine what concept in the mind of 
the beautiful object’s (hypothetical) maker guided its production. But this free play, while having 
no specific end—no conceptual synthesis toward which it aims—does have a consistent direction 
or tendency, namely, of continuing in free play (as one might expect, given an object that 
presents a puzzle that only appears to have a solution). That tendency is why this state manifests 
itself as a feeling of pleasure, which Kant defines in functional terms as “[t]he consciousness of 
the causality of a representation with respect to the state of the subject, for maintaining it in that 
state” (§10, 5: 220). Contact with beauty is pleasurable because we sense that our faculties are 
trying to remain in the beneficial state induced by the beautiful object. In Kant’s words: “We 
linger over the consideration of the beautiful because this consideration strengthens and 
reproduces itself” (§12, 5: 222).6 
2.2 Purposiveness of form 
 A major puzzle about Kant’s theory of beauty is how he makes the step from discussing 
“the form of purposiveness” (the appearance of intention, with no concrete aim) in §§10–12 to 
“purposiveness of form” in §§13–14, where he restricts judgments of beauty to the form of 
objects, as opposed to their matter. As Henry Allison remarks, “since the form of purposiveness 
is clearly not equivalent to the purposiveness of form, Kant owes us an argument, which he never 
provides, for the sudden move in §13 from the former to the latter” (2001: 132); Paul Guyer 
 
6 Why should this state of trying to solve an unsolvable puzzle be pleasurable rather than merely frustrating? I can 
best explain it in terms of an experience I've had with some novels and films I’ve greatly enjoyed: I want to know 
how they turn out, but I also never want them to end. Nehamas’s (2007) account of our relationship with beauty is 
also helpful: to find an artwork (or person) beautiful is to want to get to know it better, while believing that 
exploration can continue indefinitely without ceasing to uncover interesting, pleasing new aspects. Indeed, if one can 
easily figure out the entire purpose of an artwork and all its features—to teach a moral lesson, for example—it 
seems simplistic or trite. 
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speculates, “Perhaps Kant’s formalism […] has its roots in an inversion of terms” (1977: 58). In 
§§13–14, Kant dismisses elements like color and timbre as mere “charms” belonging only to 
“the matter of satisfaction,” suitable only for “empirical” aesthetic judgments, i.e., of 
agreeableness (5: 223). Components admitted as eligible for “pure” judgments of beauty include 
the outline of a painting or sculpture, and the composition of a piece of music, i.e., the placement 
of intervals in a rhythm. “All form of the objects of the senses,” Kant says, “is either shape or 
play […], either play of shapes (in […] mime, and dance), or mere play of sensations (in 
time)”—this last referring to music (§14, 5: 225). 
 Kant explains what he means by the form and matter of objects in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. In the Transcendental Aesthetic he says: “I call that in the appearance which 
corresponds to sensation its matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be 
ordered in certain relations I call the form of appearance” (KrV A 20/B 34). He argues that the 
form which gives sensory matter a comprehensible order must “lie ready for it in the mind a 
priori” (A 20/B 34), and that space, time, and the categories constitute this a priori form. Thus 
an object’s form comprises, first, its spatiotemporal features, including size, shape, duration, and 
number (i.e., aspects that can be measured or counted and conform to mathematical rules); and 
second, the ways it exemplifies the categories (including its causal relations and division into 
substance and accidents). However, Kant says in the Anticipations of Perception, 
“[a]pprehension, merely by means of sensation, fills only an instant” (A 167/B 209). Individual 
sensations have neither duration nor extension; only their degree of intensity (intensive 
magnitude) can be quantified, and thus count as formal structure. Kant names color, weight, 
warmth, and taste as sensations constituting the matter of experience (A 169, 175/B 211, 217). 
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 How has Kant determined that only the form of an object can be judged beautiful, while 
its matter can merely be judged agreeable? Due to features of his epistemology, judgments about 
the matter of sensation fail to meet all the criteria for judgments of beauty that he has discussed 
hereto: disinterestedness, universality, and formal purposiveness. Kant says in the Anticipations 
that sensation is “merely subjective representation, by which one can only be conscious that the 
subject is affected, and which one relates to an object in general” (B 207–8). Sensation, the 
representation of the matter of an object, requires the actual presence of the object to affect the 
subject at some time; even imagining an object’s matter in its absence requires some past contact 
to provide the sensory quality. Therefore, pleasure in sensation must involve interest: “the 
satisfaction that we combine with the representation of the existence of an object” (KU §2, 5: 
204). But judgments about an object’s form can be understood, in abstraction from the object’s 
existence, as describing structures in the a priori formal intuitions of space and time, and can 
therefore be disinterested.7 
 Judgments about the matter of sensation also cannot have the universality required of a 
judgment of beauty. Although sensation is the data that comes from the thing in itself, while the 
framework of space and time comes from the subject’s faculties, it is sensation that Kant calls 
subjective, while perception of shapes or intervals of time is objective. This counterintuitive 
designation flows from the central thesis of the First Critique: that the forms that order our 
experience, although they come from the cognizing subject, apply to the objects of experience 
because they make these objects possible. Without them, there would be no countable, 
 
7 This also explains why only judgments about form can have the (subjective) necessity required by the Fourth 
Moment, in light of Kant’s principle that only a priori judgments can carry necessity (KrV B 3). Judgments 
involving sensory qualities—not just intensive magnitudes—are always empirical, because qualities can only be 
known through perceptual experience. (Note that quality is distinct from intensity. Converting an image to grayscale 
preserves the relative intensities of the colors, but not their qualities.) But since Kant had not discussed necessity by 
the time he makes the restriction to form in the Third Moment, his argument cannot lean on it. 
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measurable, locatable objects to talk about, only a chaotic flood of sensory stimulation. We can 
assume these forms are the same in every human subject because they alone make a shared world 
of objects possible in the first place. Whatever cannot be ordered according to these forms—the 
quality of a color, sound, pain, smell, or taste—“cannot be assumed to be in accord in all 
subjects” (§14, 5: 224), and cannot be fully communicated between subjects. For all I know, the 
object that produces one quality when it affects my senses may produce a very different quality 
in someone else. The state of mind that prompts a judgment of beauty must be universally 
communicable; but the only sensible aspects of an object that can be represented in a universally 
communicable way are those which constitute its form. Kant’s deduction of pure aesthetic 
judgments turns on their restriction to formal features: I am justified in demanding that everyone 
share my judgments of beauty—and the mental state that underlies them—because the 
spatiotemporal form of objects is constituted by “that subjective element that one can presuppose 
in all human beings (as requisite for possible cognitions in general)” (§38, 5: 290). We are not 
similarly justified in assuming that contact with the same sensory matter will produce the same 
mental state in everyone, so we take judgments of agreeableness to be restricted to the person 
who makes them.8 
 
8 Guyer disputes that “the variability of sensation” and “the requirement of universal subjective validity” (1979: 
235) justify Kant’s restriction of pure judgments of taste to the form of objects, because (1) there seems to be no 
reason why sensory matter cannot be part of what induces harmonious free play in a subject’s faculties, and (2) the 
universality requirement for judgments of beauty is (or should be) logically independent from the mechanism that 
generates them, so Kant cannot appeal to it to specify restrictions on the mechanism (235–6). However, I am not 
sure Kant intended them to be independent; he proposes the mechanism of free play of the cognitive faculties on the 
basis of the universal communicability of judgments of beauty, despite their lack of a determinate concept (KU §9, 
5: 217; Johnson 1979: 168–9 makes a similar point). The presupposition of Kant’s inference seems to be that insofar 
as we feel our judgment to be universally communicable, we implicitly suppose that it involves only capacities that 
are universally shared, which means it cannot depend on elements of the object to which our response is wholly 
private. Johnson (1979: 171) rebuts Guyer’s charge that Kant’s importation of the form/matter distinction from the 
First Critique is “ad hoc” by pointing out that if concepts are ruled out as the ground of the universal validity of 
judgments of beauty, the only candidates left are the a priori formal conditions of intuition: space and time. 
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 Finally, our response to sensory matter cannot display merely formal purposiveness. We 
cannot expect that the matter of sensation will strike others the way it strikes us; so we can only 
judge it agreeable, not beautiful. To find something agreeable, Kant explained, is to form a 
desire for things of that kind, and desire always involves an end. Therefore, the state of mind 
underlying our response to an agreeable sensation cannot exhibit the mere form of purposiveness 
required for a judgment of beauty, because the end, which Kant identifies as “the matter of the 
nexus finalis” (§10, 5: 220), is present: possessing the agreeable object. The faculties do not 
spend much time trying to figure out what the object is for: the agreeableness of the sensation 
makes it seem obvious (it’s to be enjoyed), and contemplation quickly gives way to desire. But 
our mental state in response to the form of an object can exhibit this mere form of purposiveness; 
the universally communicable pleasure we take in features that can be represented a priori need 
not involve any interest in or desire to possess the object. The cognitive faculties can perceive 
purposiveness in the form of an object (e.g., judging that the shape of a wheel serves its function 
as a rotating conveyer of motion) without entering harmonious free play; purposiveness of form 
does not entail merely formal purposiveness. However, the reverse entailment does hold—which 
explains Kant’s abrupt move between §12 and §13 from the form of purposiveness to 
purposiveness of form. An object can display the mere form of purposiveness only if its 
purposiveness resides solely in its form, because only then can the sense of purposiveness be 
registered in the cognitive faculties alone, through the merely formally purposive free play, and 
not also in the faculty of desire. 
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3. The formal beauty of wine 
 For Kant, flavor and smell are among the sensations constituting the matter of 
experience. Since these are the primary traits of a wine, how could Kant’s theory admit wine as 
beautiful? What characteristics would Kant recognize as formal, hence eligible for pure 
judgments of taste? Obviously wines do not have shape or outline. They are sometimes said 
(metaphorically, it seems) to have “structure”; I explain below how this counts as form, 
according to Kant’s criteria. But one formal property that wines clearly have is duration. Tasting 
a wine is a temporally extended process, at the level of the bottle, the glass, or the mouthful; a 
good wine will take advantage of that duration to exhibit an interesting progression that engages 
the taster’s cognitive faculties. 
 In “Knowledge, Wine and Taste” (2007), Kent Bach draws a musical analogy: “the 
overall experience of a single sip of wine is comparable in duration and complexity to savoring 
one sustained musical chord” (28). “Over a few seconds, it has a beginning, a middle, and a 
finish, during which different qualities will reveal themselves […] if you pay close attention.” 
His analogy is, he says, “unflattering” (27). “No matter how sensuous and complex […] no one 
would attend a concert just to hear even the greatest orchestra play a beautiful sustained chord 
every few minutes, even a little differently each time” (28). But people would attend a concert to 
hear Mozart’s variations on “Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star.” Twelve sips of even a truly great 
wine probably would not exhibit the same variety and complexity; but I do think a sip of a good 
wine is more like a short harmonized melody than a chord. Different flavors take center stage at 
each phase of the taste; the successive primary flavors gain depth from “secondary notes” of 
(e.g.) mineral, earth, or spice. 
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 And while the basic structure remains the same from sip to sip, the expression may 
deepen and embellishments be added as the taster’s focus shifts, or as contact with the air 
releases new features. Wine critic Robert Parker describes this phenomenon in his tasting notes 
on a Rhône-style blend from Sonoma: “intense notes of sweet black cherries intertwined with 
herbal nuances. As the wine sits in the glass, tell-tale notes of raspberries…also emerge” (quoted 
Gray 2011). Even the harmonic underpinning may vary, if the wine reveals substantially 
different characteristics in subsequent mouthfuls. In 2010 I tasted a young Cabernet Sauvignon-
based blend (the 2007 Ridge Monte Bello), which needed to be aged for at least ten more years 
before reaching optimal drinking age, and I found that it evolved dramatically across sips: the 
first was spicy and strongly tannic; the most noticeable flavor in the second sip was dark plum; 
the third sip was characterized mainly by a smoky, cedar-like flavor; and the flavors continued to 
occur in this cycle throughout the taste. As the wine ages, these flavors will blend more 
smoothly, layering over each other like themes in counterpoint. But tasting them distinctly in 
successive sips was nonetheless fascinating in its way. 
 The most obvious instance of temporal structure in wine is found in a single mouthful. 
The experience begins with the aroma, which may showcase elements that are present only 
weakly or not at all in the flavor. Take these Wine Spectator tasting notes on a pair of 1999 
Rieslings from the Mosel Valley. Of the Spätlese, the review reads, “Oodles of slate greet the 
nose, followed by peach and citrus flavors on the palate”; the notes on the Kabinett read, “Earth 
and almond aromas introduce this off-dry white. Bracing in structure, with stone and lime notes” 
(quoted RWS 2005). 
 Once the wine has entered the mouth, it can continue to be a complex extended 
experience. Wines are divided into three flavor stages: the “front” or “attack,” the first 
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impression the wine makes as it hits the tongue; the “middle palate,” which describes the flavors 
that emerge as it sits in the mouth; and the “finish,” the aftertaste that lingers once it leaves the 
mouth (via swallowing or spitting). Not all wines show substantial evolution between the front 
and middle palate; not all wines have much of a finish, or one that introduces new flavors. Most 
tasting notes are divided only into aroma, palate (comprising front and middle), and finish, like 
this review of a 2008 Argentinian Malbec: “Marked by juicy plum-like fruit, with floral hints in 
the bouquet and a note resembling black-licorice in the finish” (Lukacs & Thomas 2010). Some 
wines, however, take advantage of the full span of time from attack to finish by exhibiting new 
flavors at every stage, as described by these Wine Spectator notes on another German Riesling: 
“Plenty of stone nuances introduce this lively, flavorful white, whose lime and peach notes take 
on a licorice aftertaste” (quoted RWS 2005). 
 One wine is not necessarily better than another if it takes longer to taper off, or exhibits 
more evolution within a mouthful. However, “length in the mouth” is a prized characteristic; 
reviews are more likely to complain that the finish was disappointingly short than unnecessarily 
long, that a wine goes nowhere than that it changes too much. It is not length itself, but the use a 
wine makes of its length that gives it its aesthetic quality. Length provides a wine with a stage, or 
a canvas, on which to display interest and complexity. Wine can be, in the phrase Kant uses to 
describe music, a “play of sensations in time” (§14, 5: 225). 
 A wine can even show “composition,” in the process by which a winemaker blends the 
finished product from the “proto-wine” (to invent a term) fermented from the grapes grown on a 
single lot. Say the proto-wine from Lot A gives a burst of fruit flavor that quickly fades; the 
proto-wine from Lot B has a persistent earthy, peppery flavor; and the proto-wine from Lot C is 
bland on the palate, but leaves an interesting smoky aftertaste. The wine that results from 
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blending the proto-wines from lots A, B, and C in the right proportions will be “fruit-forward,” 
with notes of earth and spice that emerge in the middle palate and linger into a peppery, smoky 
finish. Thus a skilled winemaker can “compose” a multifaceted “play of sensations” out of 
relatively staid materials. 
 Now that the analogy with musical harmony is in play, we can describe how a wine’s 
“structure” counts as formal in Kant’s sense. “Structure” refers to the balance of certain 
contrasting elements that contribute to a wine’s flavor and texture: primarily, acids, glycerin, 
tannins, and sugars. Red wines with insufficient acid relative to other components are described 
as “flabby”; they feel heavy or dull, and seem to lack a center or focus for their flavor (acid is 
sometimes described as the “core” or “backbone” of a wine). White wines with too much sugar 
relative to acid are syrupy and cloying, while those with too much glycerin relative to acid can 
seem slippery or oily, flat, even bitter. Conversely, wines with too much acid relative to tannins 
or glycerin seem thin as well as sour; they are said to lack “body”; they have focus, but no 
breadth. 
 Here, too, a musical analogy suggests itself: structure in wine can be compared to the 
balance among the voices making up a musical harmony. (Based on the talk of focus and 
breadth, one might compare the acid to the voice carrying the melody and the other components 
to the voices filling out the rest of the chord.) This kind of balance refers to relative amplitude, 
which Kant would describe as the intensive magnitude of a sound; he identifies this as the formal 
aspect of sensation (KrV A 168/B 210). Structure in wine is a ratio of the intensive magnitudes of 
our sensations of its various chemical components.  Therefore, judgments about a wine’s 
excellence or deficiency in structure should count as pure judgments of taste. 
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4. Extending form? 
 This analogy between the formal features of wine and music has limits, however. Both 
involve timed shifts among sensations, but more of the components of music are clearly formal. 
Kant knew that intervals between pitches correspond to certain ratios in frequencies of vibrations 
in the air: “[I]f one considers […] what can be said mathematically about the proportion of the 
oscillations in music […] then one may see oneself as compelled to regard the sensations […] as 
the effect of a judging of the form in the play of many sensations” (KU §51, 5: 325). Intervals 
can be mathematized, so the intervals between simultaneous and successive sounds—harmony, 
melody, harmonic progression—can be judged as beautiful forms. In wine, however, the 
sensations that play in time are aromas and flavors, which Kant views as mere unstructured 
matter striking the senses. Unlike the judging of intervals or “contrasts among colors”—which 
Kant says are “appropriate” to regard “in analogy with” pitch intervals (§51, 5: 325)—
distinguishing among flavors and aromas cannot, it seems, be regarded as a judgment of form. 
 There is a further difficulty that plagues Kant’s theory in regard to color, sound, and 
flavor. Particular sensations, Kant insists, can only be judged agreeable or disagreeable, never 
beautiful or ugly. If this is the case, then colors, timbres, and flavors could be substituted for 
each other without changing an object’s aesthetic value. A colleague of mine raised the problem 
in this pointed manner: doesn’t Kant’s formalism commit him to saying that Beethoven’s Ninth 
would be just as beautiful played on kazoos? If so, Kant is similarly committed to saying that an 
abstract painting would be just as beautiful with its colors inverted, since what matters for beauty 
is the perceptual distances between colors, not their intrinsic qualities. This would not hold for 
mimetic paintings, though, because the kind of beauty they have, adherent beauty, is constrained 
by our concept of the represented object (§16, 5: 229–31). 
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 Assuming that wine is a free beauty—an aesthetic object we come to with no concept of 
what it is for, or how it ought to be to fulfill that purpose (§16, 5: 229)—it should not matter 
which aromas and flavors are arranged to evolve at a certain pace across a span of time. If a wine 
has an aroma of wet dog, then tastes of rotten eggs with fishy notes and rubber tires on the finish, 
would it be just as beautiful as a wine that in the same timespan displays a floral aroma, a citrusy 
palate with mineral undertones, and an almond finish? Perhaps we can leave aside plainly 
disagreeable smells and flavors, which induce a displeasure that would mask any pleasure 
incurred by formal beauty. What about perfectly agreeable flavors that one would not expect to 
find in wine: salmon, spinach, peanuts?9 What makes a wine featuring those flavors less 
beautiful than a wine exhibiting more standard ones? Is there a way the quality of flavors can be 
judged as a component of form? 
4.1 Pitch, color, and Euler’s theory of light 
 Kant offers a possible solution to the color problem in the following passage: 
If one assumes, with Euler, that the colors are vibrations (pulsus) of the air immediately following 
one another, just as tones are vibrations of the air disturbed by sound, and, what is most important, 
that the mind does not merely perceive, by sense, their effect on the animation of the organ, but also, 
through reflection, perceives the regular play of the impressions (hence the form in the combination 
of different representations) (about which I have very little doubt), then colors and tones would not be 
mere sensations, but would already be a formal determination of the unity of a manifold of them, and 
in that case could also be counted as beauties in themselves.  (§14, 5: 224) 
 
Kant proposes that colors can be considered beautiful if what an observer responds to when 
making judgments about colors is the rapid regular intervals at which pulses of air strike the eye. 
The form of a color would be its rhythm, the positioning of sensory elements within a span of 
time. For Kant, form is what can be mathematized: expressed geometrically, for shapes in space, 
 
9 It was difficult to think of flavors one would not expect to find in wine, because people routinely find very odd 
ones: saddle leather, cheese, banana, artichoke, cat pee… 
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or arithmetically, for sequences and divisions of time.10 Color expressed as a wave has form in 
both space and time: a wavelength measured in nanometers, and a frequency in cycles per 
second. 
 But, importantly for my purposes, a person can correctly judge an object beautiful only if 
its form is what she is actually responding to. In the passage quoted above Kant deems it likely11 
that “the mind […], through reflection, perceives the regular play of the impressions” that make 
up a color, and judges it beautiful on account of its temporal form.  Later in the Critique, 
however, Kant expresses doubt about this possibility: 
If one considers the rapidity of the vibrations of the light, or, in [the case of sound], of the air, 
which probably far exceeds all our capacity for judging immediately in perception the proportion 
of the division of time, then one would have to believe that it is only the effect of these vibrations 
on the elastic parts of our body that is sensed, but that the division of time by means of them is 
not noticed and drawn into the judging, hence that in the case of colors and tones there is 
associated only agreeableness, not the beauty of their composition. (§51, 5: 324–5) 
 
How conscious does our sensitivity to the form have to be in order for our representation to be 
eligible for judgments of beauty? When I identify an interval as a perfect fifth, I do not count the 
pulses of air hitting my ear from each source, then calculate a ratio of two to three. Yet Kant 
 
10 An anonymous reviewer objected that if what is mathematizable in an object is the source of our aesthetic 
pleasure, then a mathematical description foregrounding those properties should be “more pleasing” than the 
obscure experience of them we have in contact with a beautiful object. Kant does seem committed to the view that a 
reproduction of the same mathematical structure (intensive as well as extensive), filled in by different sensory 
qualities, should be equally beautiful. But a sufficiently abstract mathematical description (e.g., a list matching 
intensities to coordinates in time and/or space) would not be beautiful, because it would reduce components of an 
intuition to conceptual representations, so the experience would cease to be aesthetic. In a concrete object (as 
opposed to the a priori representation a subject may construct in pure intuition), there must always be some sensory 
matter taking the beautiful form. Would it be more pleasing if the matter were somehow minimized, e.g., by 
converting an image to grayscale (which, as I note, may not even preserve all the formal aspects, such as the degree 
of difference between colors)? No: charms add to the total pleasure of the experience. But if such minimization or 
abstraction were possible while preserving all formal structure, it probably would be easier to tell that what one 
experiences truly is the pure, universalizable pleasure of beauty. 
As to the possibility of a mathematical representation in one sense modality of an experience in another—e.g., a 
visual graph of a gustatory experience (or an auditory “graph,” which would preserve time, rather than space, as the 
relevant dimension)—I am not sure how, or whether, they could be compared. 
11 In the third edition of the Critique. The parenthetical that in the third edition reads “about which I have very little 
doubt,” as quoted above, in the first and second editions says “which I very much doubt” (Guyer and Matthews 
2000: 109 n. b). I take it he changed his mind, and honor his final opinion. 
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admits that some judging of form must go on, not only because pitch involves mathematical 
relations, but also, as he remarks, because distinguishing pitches and colors is a skill not 
everyone has (§51, 5: 325). Not only are there tone-deaf and colorblind people who cannot tell 
pitches and colors apart at all, but there are otherwise perceptually normal people who cannot 
identify intervals or discriminate among similar shades.12 Another consideration Kant adduces is 
that even for skilled judges, the number of “positions on the scale of colors or tones is 
determinate for comprehensible distinctions” (§51, 5: 325): there is a minimal detectable 
distance within the “space” of possible colors or pitches. 
 Oddly, another point Kant raises in favor of regarding discrimination among colors and 
pitches as a judging of form is, “for those who can do this, the perception of an altered quality 
(not merely of the degree of the sensation) in various positions on the scale of colors or tones” 
(§51, 5: 325, emphasis added). One would think the fact that the difference is qualitative, not 
quantitative, would count against the formal status of color and tone. But Kant’s point is that 
people can make cognitive judgments not only about intensive magnitudes, but also about 
relative positions in the space of possible colors and pitches. One might think that only the 
distance between pitches matters: the aesthetic qualities of a piece should stay the same if 
transposed to any key. Yet to people with perfect pitch, a piece composed in one key sounds 
wrong in any other. They are not calculating frequencies, yet there is something about each pitch 
 
12 A reviewer wondered why the involvement of skill in judging, which appears to abrogate the universality of the 
judgments, should be a mark of form. Kant does not explain the connection; my interpretation is that only judgments 
about form admit of standards of correctness—not for judgments of beauty themselves, but for descriptive 
judgments about features relevant to judgments of beauty—that can be agreed upon by a community of experts and 
mastered only with study and practice. Since judgments about the effect of sensory matter on one’s organs are 
incommunicable, no one’s judgments can be deemed better or worse than anyone else’s. I should also note that the 
requirement of skill need not threaten the universal validity of a judgment: the conclusions of mathematical proofs 
understood only by a few experts are still universally valid. 
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that enables them to distinguish it from any other: they can judge not only distances in the space 
of pitches, but locations. 
 Kant may also be hinting at the fact that differences in perceptible quality correspond 
closely with differences in mathematical properties, which suggests that we are, to some extent, 
aware of the formal properties of colors and pitches, and responding to them accordingly. Alter 
the frequency of light or sound only slightly, and the perceived color or pitch changes only 
slightly. Pitches whose frequencies stand in simple ratios also sound similar. Simply doubling a 
frequency yields the pitch an octave above, which sounds like the same note, only higher. Pitches 
a fifth apart, whose frequencies have the ratio 3:2, sound similar enough that when played 
together, there is no perceptible tension. Thus it is called a “consonant” interval, whereas 
intervals with more complex frequency ratios (sixths, sevenths, ninths) become increasingly 
dissonant and feel more unstable, more in need of resolution to a consonant harmony. Does this 
sense of being at rest reflect a dim awareness of a simple ratio? Do the mathematical properties 
of sensible phenomena come through in the quality of sensation? If so, the “form” of experience 
may be broader than Kant thought. 
4.2 Molecular geometry and taste 
 There is a mathematizable property associated with flavor and aroma: the geometry of the 
molecules that bind to receptors in the nose or on the tongue. It is reasonable to suppose that the 
shapes of different molecules correspond to different perceived flavors. But it seems far-fetched 
to think that tasters are picking up on the geometry of the molecule that produces a given flavor. 
 Research on the chemical basis of wine flavor shows that families of molecules with 
similar structures produce similar flavors. For example, methoxypyrazines produce a 
“vegetative, herbaceous, bell pepper or earthy aroma” that is “important to [some] regional 
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style[s] of Sauvignon blanc,” including the grassy or “green” ones from New Zealand. At low 
concentrations, methoxypyrazines help to distinguish Sauvignon blanc and Cabernet Sauvignon 
from other wines, but high concentrations produce an “unpleasant and overwhelming” vegetal 
flavor (Allen & Lacey 1998: 31–2). Different combinations of esters with alcohols and acids 
produce various fruit flavors (Coombs 2008: 2). A study on volatile compounds in the juice and 
skins of Merlot and Cabernet Sauvignon grapes found that the norisoprenoid class of molecules 
was associated with a honey flavor, while flavors of chocolate and dried figs corresponded to a 
high concentration of certain benzene derivatives (Francis et al. 1998: 25; 20, Fig. 2; 24, Fig. 3). 
 There is a case to be made here for the formal nature of flavor, similar to Kant’s 
argument for the formalism of pitch and color: it requires skill and attention to detect the flavors 
produced by these chemicals in wine. They do not leap to the senses to be received passively, the 
way Kant portrays our perception of the matter of experience. And insofar as similar flavors 
correspond to similar molecular structures, the formal basis of flavor reveals itself to some extent 
in perceptual experience—much as the formal bases of color and pitch come through when light 
and sound waves of similar frequency are perceived as similar colors and nearby pitches. 
To what extent, though, does the structure of the molecule itself enter perceptual 
experience? We can perceive higher and lower acid content in wine: very low-acid Viogniers can 
feel oily, whereas high-acid wines like Chablis and Chianti are perceived as having a light, clean 
texture. This may reflect the greater water-solubility of acidic compounds, hence their tendency 
to “go down” cleanly rather than coat the mouth. Beyond that, it is hard to see an intuitive 
connection between molecule shape and flavor quality. Do round molecules produce “rounded” 
flavors, while jagged molecules produce piquant flavors? Maybe, if you would describe the 
flavors of chocolate and bell peppers (produced by benzenoids and methoxypyrazines, whose 
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identifying components are ring-shaped) as “round.” Acids, which contribute the sharp flavors in 
wine, usually have hydrogen atoms hanging off an oxygen-based group, making the molecule 
“jagged” in a sense. But even if this is the case, the shape resemblances are irrelevant. What 
produces different flavor qualities is which taste and smell receptors the molecules react with—a 
minute, complex process which, to borrow Kant’s words, “far exceeds all our capacity for 
judging immediately in perception” (KU §51, 5: 324–5). There doesn’t seem to be any reason 
that, e.g., we perceive acids as having a sour quality; those are just the receptors they happen to 
stimulate. 
4.3 Closing the gap: adherent beauty 
 Do we have enough to defend the formal status of flavor? At best, we can claim that 
similarities and contrasts count as formal. But then, just as Kant’s theory appears to imply that an 
abstract painting would be just as beautiful with its colors inverted, it also seems to imply that a 
wine would retain all its aesthetic virtues if its flavor qualities were altered while the perceptual 
distances remained constant. So we are back to the question why a wine with flavors of cherry, 
oak, and chocolate is more beautiful than a wine tasting of mustard, pickles, and sausage. 
 Apparently I must bite a bullet and say it is not necessarily more beautiful, as long as 
both wines show engaging evolution throughout their length, and the degrees of similarity and 
difference among their component flavors are such that they balance and harmonize well, even in 
unexpected ways. But this admission is not so painful if it gains me the possibility of pure 
aesthetic judgments about well-crafted food as well as wine. Yes, the flavors of sausage, 
mustard, and pickles can be artfully, intriguingly combined: there can be a beautiful hamburger. 
 The notion of adherent beauty could set limits on the flavors admissible in a beautiful 
wine. Free beauty, Kant says, “presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be,” while 
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adherent beauty “does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance 
with it” (§16, 5: 229). Most tasters come to wine with some concept of what it should be; 
educated tasters come with a concept of the qualities each varietal should have. For example, a 
writer for Wine Review Online complains that California Pinot noir is “too big, too ripe, and too 
high in alcohol”—too much, say, like Syrah or Cabernet. This judge thinks Pinot noir should be 
“light-colored, elegant [with] great acidity […] delicate in structure—[like] the best Burgundies” 
(McCarthy 2012). But preexisting concepts of what a wine ought to be like should not set too-
severe limits on the flavors it can display while still being considered beautiful. The wines that 
set my faculties into the liveliest play are the ones that surprise me. Merlot can taste like grilled 
meat in barbecue sauce; Traminer can taste uncannily like roses; Pinot noir can smell like a 
redwood forest by the ocean. Who knew? 
 Kant notes that judgments of adherent beauty are not pure judgments of taste: 
To be sure, taste gains by this combination of aesthetic satisfaction with the intellectual in that it…can 
have rules prescribed to it […] But in this case these are also not rules of taste, but merely rules for 
the unification of taste with reason, i.e., of the beautiful with the good… Strictly speaking, however, 
perfection does not gain by beauty, nor does beauty gain by perfection […].  (KU §16, 5: 230–31) 
 
Something is gained and something lost if we judge wines as adherent rather than free beauties. 
We gain opportunities to apply knowledge, clearer standards for judging, and diverse standards 
for different types. But we lose opportunities to be pleasantly surprised at the beauty of a wine 
that tastes like barbecue. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 I have argued that many judgments about wine fit the template for judgments of beauty 
that Kant lays out in the Analytic of the Beautiful. I have also argued that the experience of wine 
has at least one dimension that is formal in Kant’s sense: its temporal structure, the evolution of 
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aromas and flavors across the time it takes to finish a mouthful or a glass. An interesting wine is 
a multilayered “play of sensations in time,” much like a short piece of music. Lastly, I 
considered how to accommodate flavor quality to Kant’s notion of form, by first looking at 
Kant’s own arguments why color and tone might have formal structure, then noting parallels 
among the ways perceptual experience registers the mathematizable formal structures of color, 
pitch, and flavor (frequencies and ratios of light and sound waves; the geometry of aromatic 
molecules). Judgments about the specific quality of aromas and flavors probably cannot be 
considered formal. But perhaps the relations of similarity and difference we perceive between 
flavors, and their tendency to blend or clash—like the same relations among colors and pitches—
can be. 
 The upshot is that Kant’s theory of taste is not so restrictive that it has no way to 
accommodate the genuinely aesthetic value of wine—and food. In fact, as we learn more about 
the structure of our own perceptual mechanisms and the world we perceive, more of our sensory 
experience may come to seem formal even in Kant’s narrow spatiotemporal sense; and so his 
aesthetics will be able to make sense of our tendency to judge as beautiful things like aroma and 
flavor that Kant thought could only be judged agreeable.  
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